



## HOUTHI WARFIGHTING TECHNIQUES

14 August 2019

### Key Judgements

- The gradual and methodical growth of the Houthi insurgency has created a formidable fighting force. It is primarily a war fighting machine, and governance of the civilian populace is of secondary importance to the Houthis, nevertheless the latter have been utilised to aid Houthi defensive techniques. [REDACTED]
- A sophisticated Iranian inspired info ops campaign, typically promulgating both accurate and inaccurate accounts of SLC airstrikes, is a significant force multiplier for the Houthi campaign. [REDACTED]
- A significant proportion of Houthi fighters are/have been child soldiers, possibly as many as 18,000. [REDACTED]
- The Houthi fighters generally do not wear military uniform and also avoid the use of military type vehicles, preferring to use civilian vehicles. This is almost certainly a deliberate policy of using civilians as cover from airstrikes. [REDACTED]
- SLC airstrikes and air superiority over western Yemen has forced the Houthis to use residential areas, hospitals and mosques as cover for military operations, basing and storage of weapons and ammunition. [REDACTED]





















Annex 2 to Exhibit 1A



Annex 2: Contains material relied upon in relation to JIAT.
















## Annex 3 to Exhibit 1A




CREDIBLE - KSA Only



## Annex 4 to Exhibit 1A



Credible - KSA & Credible - Not Known





## Annex 5 to Exhibit 1A



Analysis of Flagged Incidents of Concern

No.	Tracker Serial No.	Date	Incident/ Alleged Civcas	Category/ JIAT Report?	IHL Assessment	Comments	Trend?
	Not Credible; Not Known Credible; KSA Credible; Other Credible; Other Coalition Partner Credible; Unable to Assess Credible; Awaiting Assessment			JIAT: yes/no; UN POE: yes/no; IHL Update; Priority List; (Compensation); no; initial report; (Prosecution); (Prosecution and Compensation)	Unlikely; NA; Possible; Insufficient Information		Weapon malfunction; Weather; Collateral damage. Moving vehicle ;Error of Identification; Collateral Damage; Failure to apply RoE; Moving vehicle. Problem with orders; Moving target. Weapon malfunction.















































































































## Annex 6 to Exhibit 1A



Annex 6: Document dated November 2016 - diplomatic correspondence relied upon in relation to the Great Hall incident.







## Annex 7 to Exhibit 1A



Annex 7: Document dated September 2018 containing material relied upon in relation to the Dhayan Bus incident - proposed steps to be taken.



## Annex 8 to Exhibit 1A



Annex 8: A document dated November 2018 containing material relied upon in relation to the Dhayan Bus incident - re HMG visit to KSA October 2018.



## Annex 10 to Exhibit 1A



Exhibit 10: Document dated October 2019, IHL Engagement Plan, updated position since September 2018



















