Libya is an oil-rich north African country. A former Italian colony, Libya emerged from over 40 years of the Gaddafi dictatorship to two civil wars since 2011. It currently has two rival administrations that continue to compete for control: the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which was appointed as an interim authority through a UN led process, and a parallel body that controls eastern and southern Libya, the Government of National Stability (GNS). Elections originally scheduled for December 2021 have been postponed indefinitely after Libyan stakeholders failed to agree on a legislative and constitutional basis.
Because of the shifting formation and dissolution of various Libyan factions, reliable data about their arms acquisitions is difficult to establish. Nevertheless, arms flows to some of Libya’s key armed groups and authorities are discussed below.
Libya’s ongoing conflicts
The first Libyan civil war began in February 2011, following widespread pro-democracy protests as part of the wider “Arab Spring”. A significant area of grievance was widespread repression. Many western companies had supplied or marketed expensive and extensive military and surveillance technologies to Gaddafi’s government, which deployed them ruthlessly. The South African government financed VASTech to supply an expansive nationwide communications surveillance system, as did French company Amesys. UK companies also sold armoured vehicles, machine guns, small arms ammunition, tear gas and riot gear to the Gaddafi regime in the run-up to the civil war. For example, Accuracy International and Herstal Group promoted the sale of weapons to Libya in the months preceding the 2011 revolution according to a Times investigation. Libya was a “priority market” for the UK Defence & Security Exports in the years preceding the conflict (it was removed from the list in February 2011 but back on in 2013). Libyan military delegations also regularly attended arms fairs.
In February 2011, as protests and fighting were escalating, the UN Security Council imposed an open ended arms embargo on Libya and by March, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution to impose a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace. The conflict swiftly morphed into a civil war between the forces loyal to Gaddafi and anti-government forces. During this period, Gaddafi’s military lay siege to various rebel-held areas. Both sides accused each other of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the UN Security Council referred Libya to the International Criminal Court in March.
Following a UN Security Council resolution, A NATO-led coalition including the UK, US, and France joined the fray in March with an extensive bombing and reconnaissance campaign. NATO ships and aircraft began enforcing a blockade of the country. By May, NATO forces were carrying out airstrikes of government military targets, killing civilians in the process. By June, British and French helicopters were attacking and destroying key government military assets, while rebels took more territory. By August, rebel troops surrounded Tripoli; according to US officials, Gaddafi was preparing to abandon his post and flee as various of his top brass were being killed. Rebel forces captured Gaddafi on 20 October. They brutally killed him and executed dozens of detainees believed to be loyalists.
Libya’s transitional government ceded authority to an elected General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012. Almost immediately the GNC began to face significant challenges to its mandate. A new phase of the conflict began in 2014, following elections that created a House of Representatives (HoR) that would govern until a constitution could be written. The United Nations helped establish and formally endorsed Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2015.
Almost immediately a rival military, the Libyan National Army (LNA), was formed led by General Khalifa Haftar. It is referred to by the acronym HAF (Hafter-Allied Forces) or LAAF (Libyan Arab Armed Forces). Between 2014 and 2020, power in Libya was split between these two competing governments, with the GNA government backed by the UN, and the LNA/Haftar-led government backed by Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. A loose and shifting alliance of Islamist militants, including Islamic State-affiliates, denounced the elections and fought on various fronts.
Fighting continued until 2020, when parties agreed to a cease-fire. A UN-supported process led to the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU). Elections have still not been held, and fighting has ebbed and flowed for the past five years.
Arms flows from 2014 to present
Though officially under a UN arms embargo, arms, munitions and equipment continue to flow freely to Libya, “with some Member States continuing to violate it with impunity” according to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya in 2022. The war has been notable for its heavy use of drones on both sides, analysts have called the conflict a “tech battleground”. A review of key equipment and suppliers to both sides follows.
GNA
The GNA’s armed forces comprise the remains of Libya’s official military as well as local militias, with more than thirty thousand fighters. It has received significant military aid from Turkey, Italy, and Qatar at various points.
In 2020, between 1,500 and 3,000 Turkish-supported Syrian fighters were estimated to be fighting with the GNA, while the number of Turkish troops was estimated at between 200 and 500, according to diplomats quoted by Reuters. Turkish arms supplied to the GNA include a large numbers of drones, particularly Bayraktar TB2 drones and Bayraktar Akinci heavy CISR drones. Additionally, Turkish forces had trained GNA troops, according to the UN Panel of Experts. In 2020, the BBC identified what it reported as likely illegal arms shipments from Turkey to Libya, likely to the GNA. Other equipment held by the GNA included a an RTX MIM-23 Hawk air defence systems at its Al-Watiya air base , which were neutralised in a strike by an unidentified UAV in early 2020.
LNA
Haftar’s LNA reportedly had a fighting force of 25,000 troops and was backed by Egypt, France, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia at various points.
In 2017, the UN’s Libya sanctions committee revealed that the UAE had supplied equipment to the LNA including Belarussian-made attack helicopters and other military aircraft. It also identified armoured personnel carriers delivered by ship from Saudi Arabia, likely Emirati-made Panther T6 and Tygra models. In 2020, a Chinese-made Wing Loong drone was linked to a strike that killed cadets at a military academy in Libya’s capital Tripoli in January 2020, according to a BBC investigation. In 2019, the UN found that the UAE had violated the 2011 UN arms embargo on Libya by sending Wing Loong drones and Blue Arrow 7 missiles into Libya. The UAE is thought to have sent more than 100 deliveries by air since mid-January, according to flight-tracking data. Patrol vehicles built by Canadian company Streit were purchased by UAE companies and sent to Libya in 2011.
Russia is reported to have sent two thousand mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group of mercenaries to fight alongside the LNA. In May 2020, it reportedly sent more than a dozen fighter jets to support the contractors. The LNA possessed counter drone systems including the Russian Pantsir missile systems supplied by the UAE. In December 2025, Pakistan was reported to have secured a deal worth US$4 billion to supply the LNA with 16 Pakistani-Chinese-built JF-17 fighter jets.
Arms flows through Libya
The widespread insecurity in Libya for over a decade has facilitated the movement of foreign fighters across Libya’s borders, and the commercial and state-sponsored transfer of weapons via Libya to conflicts further afield.
Large amounts of Libyan weaponry have been trafficked southward to Sahelian armed groups, particularly in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria.Ground research in 2015 and 2016 by Conflict Armament Group established that Qaddafi era weapons caches had been diverted to Tuareg and Islamist armed groups in Mali, and that some Libyan-origen materiel had reached Syrian shortly after the 2012 uprising, and subsequently reached Islamic State forces. CAR noted that since 2011, Sudan has been a significant source of combatants and small arms ammunition in Libya, some of which may have reached western Sahelian groups.
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces led by General Hemedti has provided a significant market for arms smuggled from and through Libya. Weapons moved through Chad and Libya via diversion, resale and spillovers shaped by brokerage networks, local tensions, price signals and the involvement of mercenary and auxiliary forces, according to analysis by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Libya and border control
Libya is a key partner in the EU and UK’s efforts to close its borders to irregular migration. In the past few years, the UK government has spent millions of pounds fortifying transport facilities in Calais, the point of departure for many migrants seeking to cross the Channel. Southern and Eastern European countries have built thousands of kilometres of fences to prevent crossings.
The closure of land routes to Europe has forced those seeking a better future to risk the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean, especially from Libya. In what amounts to the EU outsourcing “migration control” to Libya, the EU has equipped, trained and supported the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept people at sea and return them. Migrants in Libya experience appalling levels of violence and exploitation, including being sold for slave labour. Mass graves containing apparent migrant bodies have been found in Libya.
The Libyan government has worked closely with the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) to prevent crossings since its establishment in 2007.Frontex’ aerial surveillance enables the Libyan coast guard to intercept boats. Drones used in Libyan waters include IAI Heron unarmed drones. Frontex agents have reported to the media that they have been successfully “encouraging” Libya to take the captured migrants back. The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya, established in 2013, “supports the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security.” Frontex has investigated allegations of abuses by Libyan search and rescue actors at sea, but those investigations “did not entail outreach to the Libyan authorities,” reports StateWatch.
Frontex spent €2 billion in grants between 2008 and 2024 to states to prevent crossings, much of which has been to European arms and security giants like Airbus, Leonardo, and Elbit Systems. This has included plans for the construction of an EU-funded Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Haftar-controlled Benghazi.
